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On Excess Compensation Earned by
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Maurice Joy

This paper examines compensation for the underwriting activity in firm
commitment initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock in the U.S.
When compensation for origination, management and marketing efforts
are excluded from total underwriter compensation, we find that the
portion of the total compensation assigned for the underwriting activity
itself exceeds theoretical compensation only for issues that sell out very
quickly. We interpret this finding as empirical evidence supporting the
incentive for underwriters to underprice IPOs. Finally, we find excess
compensation to underwriters is positively related to the riskiness of the
IPO and negatively related to the degree of competition among
investment bankers and the size of the IPO.

I. IN TRO DUCTIO N

Recently, Kunimura and lihara [12] and Bae and Levy [2] have suggested
that positive excess compensation, on average, is earned by underwriters in
firm commitment offerings of seasoned stock in the United States.’ The
purpose of tbis paper is to determine whether, on average, excess
compensation is also earned by underwriters in firm commitment initial
public offerings (IPOs) of common stock in tbe U.S. We also identify
characteristics of issuing firms and underwriters that are associated with
excess compensation wben it does occur.
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In a firm commitment underwriting, underwriters typically perform
three activities for the issuing company. These activities include origination
and management, distribution, and underwriting (or the actual purchase)
of the issue. When underwriters purchase shares of stock from issuing
companies in firm commitment offerings, they accept the risk that the shares
might only be sold at a price below the offer price; and that, for a time,
unwanted inventory of stock might have to be carried. Furthermore,
according to the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, offered shares cannot be sold above the offer price before
the underwriting account is officially closed. Thus, it is important for the
underwriter to appropriately price the shares in order to minimize the risk
of a failed offering, yet still earn an appropriate return for the activities
performed. Smith [24,25] has pointed out that the offering of new shares at
a fixed offer price is analogous to the sale of a call option to potential
investors. In this case, the option is sold by the underwriter since it is assumed
that the underwriter has officially taken possession of the shares at the time
of the offer. The sale of a call option backed by the possession of shares
represents a covered call position and is effectively modeled as a put option.
This is the approach taken here and, thus, borrows from the previous work
by Smith [24,25].
Following Bae and Levy [2], Kunimura and lihara [12], Smith [23], and
Marsh [14], the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model (OPM) is used to
estimate the theoretical value of the underwriting risk premium. Any
difference between the actual compensation paid to the underwriter for
accepting the risk of the underwriting and the theoretical value determined
by the Black-Scholes OPM is viewed as excess compensation earned by the
underwriter.^
The paper is important for several reasons. First, no prior work provides
an estimate of the excess compensation available to underwnriters in firm
commitment initial public offerings of common stock. This paper fills that
gap. Second, underwriter compensation is a significant portion of total issue
costs in IPOs and thereby deserves additional study (see Ritter [21]). Finally,
as Logue [13], Johnson and Miller [11] and Tinic [26] suggest, new issue
underpricing and the amount of compensation paid to underwriters may
be related. Accordingly, the underwriter compensation results obtained here
may also provide evidence, at least indirectly, on IPO underpricing.
The results of the paper indicate that when the actual portion of the
total underwriter compensation that is designated for the underwriting
activity only is compared to the estimated underwriting risk premium as
based on a 1 day option maturity, underwriters earn significant excess
compensation. However, the excess compensation turns negative if the
implied option maturity is longer than 3 days, suggesting that investment
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bankers have an incentive to sell the issue out quickly. Underpricing, then,
becomes a viable means of ensuring a speedy distribution. The excess
compensation results of this paper support the findings of Bae and Levy [2]
for offerings of seasoned securities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the 0PM characterization of underwriter risk premium used here. Section
III presents the data, empirical tests and results. Section IV identifies firm
and underwriter characteristics associated with excess returns in IPOs.
Section V contains a summary and the paper’s conclusions.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
As mentioned previously, Smith [24,25] recognized that underwriters of firm
commitment offerings implicitly sell a call option to investors. Investors have
the right but not the obligation to purchase shares from the underwriter at
the offer price. Once the underwriter purchases shares from the issuing firm,
however, the underwriter has an inventory of shares. Hence the call option
sale represents a covered call option position for the underwriter. The covered
call option position is routinely modeled as a put option since the short sale
of a put option and the covered call position are essentially equivalent.^ To
make reading of the paper consistent, the covered call position will be referred
to as the put option from this point forward.
Bae and Levy [2] provide a detailed derivation of the put option value
of underwriting services in firm commitment offerings and show that the
value of the underwriting contract, U, is
U = -e 'p + { X - B )

where p represents a put option, X represents the offer price of the issue,
and B represents the bid price paid by the underwriter to the issuing
company. Thus, in this case, (X —B) represents compensation paid to the
underwriter by the issuing firm, net of underwriting expenses typically
faced by underwriters in firm commitment offerings. The value of the put
option premium should reward the underwriter for having accepted the
risk associated with the transfer of stock from the issuing company. In an
efficient market, and if underwritings are costless, then the value of U must
be equal to 0.
Like fungible options traded on an exchange, most of the parameters
of the put option model are straightforward or can be easily estimated. An
exception is the maturity of the put. Because we are, in part, dealing with
the sale of a call option to investors, the maturity of the put option (i.e..
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the valuation of the covered call position) corresponds to the length of time
the investment banker is exposed to underwriting risk. It appears the legal
liability of underwriters in an IPO extends for 30 days/ Many IPOs, however,
are oversubscribed and sell out on the offering date. As a result, it is not clear
whether an option maturity of 30 days, one day, or some intermediate value
is appropriate. Kunimura and lihara [12], for example, use eight days as the
maturity of the put option in their work on seasoned issues of common stock.
Bae and Levy [2] use maturities ranging from one to five days in their analysis
of seasoned offerings. Marsh [14] uses a maturity of approximately 25 days
in his work on valuing underwriting agreements in UK rights issues, since
the exercise price in a British rights offering is set roughly 25 days before
the exercise date. Taking the assumptions of previous work into account,
we employ three different maturities for the put option in our work: 30 days,
corresponding to the Master Agreement Among Underwriters; 8 days,
corresponding to the work by Kunimura and lihara [12]; and, 1 day,
corresponding to the length of time it typically takes a new issue to be fully
distributed. Other parameter estimates for the put option are described below.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Stock Return Variance, VAR(i), is the annualized rate of return
variance based on stock returns generated over the first 30 trading days;
Exercise Price, C{i), equals the offer price;
Stock Price,X(z), equals the offer price;
Riskless Return, R(J), is the rate of return on U. S. T-Bills with maturity
equal to that of the put option.

The variance estimate is similar to that used by Ritter [20]. It requires
data that are not known to the underwriter at the time of the pricing decision;
however, as he notes, since no trading scheme is being employed, there is
little harm in using this data to obtain model estimates.^
The maturity of the put option specifies the maturity of the riskless asset
used to arrive at the option value. In particular, the 30 day T-Bill rate on
the effective date of the registration statement is selected as the riskless rate
of interest when option maturity is 30 days. When option maturity is 8 (1)
days the 8 (1) day T-Bill rate is used.
The offer price is the price at which investors can purchase stock from
the underwriter and so corresponds to the exercise price of the put option.
Likewise, the offer price is the first market price of the stock and is closest
in time to the effective date of the registration statement. As a result, offer
price is used as an estimate of both the current market price of the stock and
the exercise price of the put.
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III. DATA, EMPIRICAL TESTS, AND RESULTS
The SEC’s Registrations and Offerings Statistics (ROS) File is used to
identify the population of non-Regulation A IP O s/ The 1987 version of the
ROS File covers the period 1973-1987 and identifies approximately 2800 such
offerings.’ Our sample period is limited to 1977-1987 since data on the ROS
File (and other sources) are incomplete prior to 1977.* The 1977-1987 period
contains 2658 or approximately 95% of the IPOs that appear on the ROS
File between 1973 and 1987. Between 1977-87 there were 1250 IPOs that were
issued that included warrants issued to the underwriter. Of the remaining
issues 139 were part of a unit offering that included other securities. The
value of the warrant provision is difficult to estimate and, in addition, may
affect the size of actual underwriter compensation paid by the issuing firm.^
As a result, these offerings are excluded from the sample. Similarly, the
amount of underwriter compensation due solely to the stock transaction in
unit offerings is ambiguous and these firms are also excluded from the
sample. After eliminating the above firms as well as the offerings of financial
institutions, a total of 1130 IPOs were available between 1977-87. From this
total of 1130 available firms, a random sample of 209 firms was selected for
study here. A sampling procedure was necessary since nearly all IPOs initially
trade in the OTC market and data collection was costly.
Summzu'y values for selected variables by year are shown in Table 1.
For the sample, the gross spread ranged from as little as 4% to over 10% and
averaged 7.41% over the 11 year period. The gross spread was negatively
correlated with issue size: the spread to underwriters for the quartile of largest
IPOs averaged 6.64% and for the quartile of smallest IPOs 8.37%. These results
are consistent with those reported by Mendelson [15] for larger IPOs during
the 1945-1963 period and Ritter [21] for larger IPOs during the 1977-82
period. The average gross spread results for the random sample used here
are also consistent with the full sample results as provided by Aggarwal and
Rivoli [1]. Aggarwal and Rivoli, studying firm commitment IPOs over the
same time frame, and for a sample of 1556 firms, found the average gross
underwriter spread to be 8.24%. Thus, the gross spread results of the sample
used here are reasonably representative of the full sample. The average offer
price of $13.00 per share is similar to that reported by Miller and Reilly [17]
who found common stock IPOs averaged $11.13 per share during the 198283 period. The average issue size of $26.2 million exceeds the $17.4 million
reported by Carter and Manaster [6]. This disparity in issue size is caused
primarily by our 1987 data.** Excluding 1987 data, the average issue size for
our sample is $19.4 million, comparable to the Carter and Manaster study.
Finally, the average first day (offering day) return of 7.64% is a measure of
issue underpricing and is similar to the 9.87% reported by Miller and Reilly
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[17]. A test of the pooled mean of 7.64% against zero permits rejection of the
null hypothesis of zero at the 95% confidence level (f=6.10). Thus our sample
exhibits the significant underpricing phenomenon reported in prior IPO
work. Relative to other IPO studies, our sample contains somewhat larger
issues but with other firm characteristics comparable to those found in prior
work.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the excess return results from employing
the Black-Scholes OPM to estimate the theoretical underwriter risk premium
as a put option.'^ The results in Panel A also assume that underwriting
expenses are zero. T hat is, the entire spread, (X — B), represents payment
made to the underwriter for taking on risk. Thus, excess compensation is
measured for each IPO as the difference between the actual gross spread and
the estimated risk premium. These values are then aggregrated cross
sectionally. Excess compensation results are shown for option values with
30, eight, and one day maturities, respectively. The cross-sectional variance
of these differences is estimated to perform a t-test of the paired difference
sample mean. For the 30 day maturity, the results show, on average, actual
compensation for risk exceeds estimated compensation by 0.96% (i=5.55).
When the maturity of the put option is reduced to eight days to provide results
comparable to Kunimura and lihara [12], average excess compensation
increases to 4.37% (t=42.8). When maturity is specified at one day, average
excess compensation is 6.40% (t=94.7).
The Panel A results reported above assume that the gross spread
represents the fee paid by the issuing company for the underwriting activity.
As noted previously, underwriters originate, manage and distribute an IPO
in addition to underwriting the issue. A review of the Investment Dealers
Digest shows that between 10% and 30% of the gross spread is typically
specified for the underwriting activity — the remainder is compensation for
origination, management and distribution efforts. Since the fee for
underwriting activity is the portion of the gross spread charged by the
investment banker for risk taking, it may be more appropriate to compare
the estimated risk premium to the underwriting activity fee. It is assumed
that the underwriter receives just enough compensation to cover the costs
associated with management and distribution of the issue. The underwriting
activity portion of the gross spread was collected for each offering through
information from the Investment Dealers Digest. When actual underwriter
compensation for only the underwriting activity is considered, a quite
different set of results occurs. These results are shown in Panel B of Table
2. Here excess compensation is negative (and significant) for put option
maturities of 30 and eight days but positive and significant for the one day
maturity. Assuming the Investment Dealer Digest breakdown of fees is
appropriate for each issue, these results suggest positive excess compensation
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Table 1
Summary Statistics by Year for IPOs
Issued Between 1977 and 1987
Year

# Sample Firms

Average Gross
Spread^

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

6
11
19
12
22
11
44
17
18
34
15

7.83%
7.61%
7.82%
7.60%
7.64%
7.26%
7.12%
7.66%
7.28%
7.27%
7.31%

50.11%
68.88%
63.36%
76.42%
66.81%
53.32%
53.36%
41.86%
52.50%
53.22%
53.22%

All

209

7.41%

50.94%

Year

Average
Offer Price

Average First
Day Return'"

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
All
Notes:

$10.46
15.48
12.99
17.38
12.86
14.00
14.55
9.58
12.21
13.00
11.28
$13.00

4.91%
11.41%
8.26%
18.22%
3.75%
3.44%
7.19%
1.71%
6.99%
11.08%
6.46%
7.64%

Average Annual Std.
Dev. of Returns

Average Issue Size
{in Millions)
1 6.51
9.94
8.87
19.10
12.48
18.85
25.73
20.98
23.98
23.95
114.76
$ 26.24

“ As a percent of Offer Price
(Closing Bid Price - Offer Price)/Offer Price

for underwriters occurs only in IPOs that sell out quickly. For IPOs that
do not sell quickly, underwriters experience economic losses i.e., negative
excess compensation, associated with their underwriting activities.
These results provide strong empirical evidence on the incentive for
underwriters to sell out IPOs quickly and, hence, avoid economic losses on
their underwriting activities. They also provide strong evidence on the
incentive for underwriters to underprice new issues. Underpricing is the most
direct way to create excess demand for new shares and to ensure they sell
quickly. Accordingly, our results could also be interpreted as empirical
evidence on the incentive for underwriters to underprice IPOs: absent

60

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

2(1)1992

Table 2
Excess Compensation Earned by Underwriters in IPOs: 1977-87
Put Option Maturity

Excess Return

t-value

Panel A: Gross Spread^
30 Days
8 Days
1 Day

0.96%
4.37%
6.40%

5.55
42.81
94.73

Panel B: Compensation for Underwriting Services Only
29.29
30 Days
-4.82%
16.95
8 Days
-1.41%
18.64
IDay
0.62%
Note:

“ (Offer Price - Net Offer Price)/Offer Price

underpricing, underwriters are exposed to substantial risks of economic
losses associated with underwriting activity.
Finally, although put option value is not a linear function of time and
as a result, excess compensation results are not a linear function of time,
a linear approximation is useful for small changes in option maturity. Using
this approximation, we note that excess compensation averages zero at about
2.8 days. This suggests, on average, shares that sell in less than three days
provide underwriters with positive excess compensation; shares that require
more than three days provide underwriters negative excess compensation.'^
W hether any particular IPO provides positive or negative excess
compensation for underwriters depends upon the weighted average length
of time required to sell shares. For example, if 90% of an issue is sold on
the first day of the offering and 10% is sold on the 20th day, the weighted
average length of time required to sell shares would be three days and the
underwriter would earn approximately zero excess compensation on the
entire issue.
Since the underwriting portion represents, on average, 22% of the total
underwriter compensation for this sample, the 0.62% average excess
compensation for a 1 day option maturity represents 38% of the average
payment made by the issuing company for the underwriting activity and 8.4
% of the sample average gross spread. These are, by no means, small
percentages; especially if the great majority of issues sell out on the first day
of the offer. Consequently, for these quick selling issues, the proportionately
large amount of excess compensation relative to the payment for the
underwriting activity suggests the capture of quasi-rents by underwriters.
Thus, the results support the idea of the payment of reputational capital
as suggested by Beatty and Ritter [4], Booth and Smith [5], and Carter and
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Manaster [6], among others. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that
the capture of these quasi-rents makes up for losses associated with slow
moving issues. As noted before, the excess compensation associated with the
underwriting activity disappears within 3 days. If the cost of holding
inventory is also added on, underwriters would realize zero returns sooner
than 3 days post-offer.
IV.
FIRM, MARKET AND UNDERWRITER
CHARACTERISTICS AND EXCESS COMPENSATION
We next perform a cross-sectional analysis to identify firm, market, and
underwriter characteristics associated with excess compensation. We employ
a multiple regression model for this purpose where the selection of
independent variables for the regression equation follows prior work. We
also include a (0,1) dummy variable for H ot/Cold new issue markets based
upon work by Ibbotson [9], Ibbotson and Jaffe [10], and Ritter [20].
The independent variables are:
VAR(?) = annualized rate of return variance based on stock returns
generated over the first 30 trading days (in natural log form);
ISS(j) = dollar value of shares offered for sale for security i (in natural
log form);
COMP(i) = underwriter competition measured as a (0,1) dummy variable
indicating the presence or absence of a leading investment
banking firm in the offering;
H{i) = a 0,1 dummy variable indicating a hot or cold new issue
market.
VAR(i) is used as a proxy for firm risk. Ritter [20] points out that a
measure of volatility is a plausible measure of firm risk since firms with
greater aftermarket volatility are also firms with greater pre-offer uncertainty
associated with their market value. ISS(?) is a proxy for both firm size and
economies of scale associated with underwritings (see, for example, Logue
[13] and Hansen, Fuller and Janjigian [8]). Larger firms are expected to float
larger issues and should be better known to the investing public. Larger issues
also represent greater dollars over which underwriters can spread their fixed
costs.
COMP(z) represents a measure of underwriter competition, where
COMP(z) = 1 if a national underwriter is the managing underwriter, 0
otherwise. The logic behind COMP(i) is that an issuer who has been able
to attract a national underwriter as the managing underwriter has, therefore,
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been able to establish a more competitive environment for the underwriting
relative to the environment that would exist if a small regional underwriter
were managing the issue. The national/regional classification of an
underwriter is provided by various Securities Industry yearbooks (also, see
Pugel and White [19]).
Finally, HOT(i) refers to a hot or cold issue market and attempts to
account for the market environment into which the IPO will be sold. A hot
issue, according to Ibbotson and Jaffe [10], refers to a specific IPO that has
risen above its offering price by a greater than average premia in the
aftermarket. A hot issue market occurs when many such stocks are issued
in a specific time period. In terms of the time period for this study, previous
research by Ritter [20] and Muscarella and Vetsuypens [18] has identified the
time periods of 1980 through the first quarter of 1981 as well as 1983 as hot
issue markets. HOT(?) = 1 for a stock issued in a hot issue market, 0 otherwise.
The independent variables used in the regression model represent a
relatively short list. However, as based on the results from previous work,
some of which has been noted, they represent those variables that, in one
measure or another, have been expected to exert an influence on variables
such as underwriter compensation.^*
Before examining excess compensation, we first perform the regressions
using actual gross spread as the dependent variable. This allows us to
compare our results directly with prior work on underv^iter compensadon
in offerings of seasoned common stock. We expect a positive sign for the
coefficient on return variance; a negative sign for issue size; a negative sign
for underwriter competition; and a negative sign for H ot/Cold markets
indicating increased underwriter compensation in Hot Issue markets. These
results are shown as regressions 1 and 2 in Table 3.
Regression 1 shows that gross spread is positively related to the riskiness
of the issue, VAR(«); and negatively related to both the size of the issue, ISS(?‘),
and the degree of competition among underwriters COMP(i). There is little
association between gross spread and the market environment as measured
by the 0,1 dummy variable for H ot/Cold new issue markets. These results
are as expected and are similar to those reported elsewhere for new issues
of seasoned securities. When we focus on only the underwriting portion of
actual gross spread in Equation 2, we obtain similar results.
Next we examine the relationship between excess compensation earned
by underwriters and issue riskiness, investment banker competition, market
environment and firm size. We expect signs on the regression coefficients
to be as above with the exception of return variance, VAR(?). For VAR(0
we expect a negative sign with the logic being that greater return volatihty
means a greater chance that the investment banker will have to sell the issue
below the offer price, thus reducing excess compensation. We report results
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Table 3
Underwriter Compensation in IPOs Regressed
Against Market, Firm and Underwriter Variables^
#

V A R (it

ISS(i)

COMP(i)

H(i)

F

R'

r

0.0078
(1.35)

-0.0985
(15.03)*

-0.0195
(1.63)

-0.0056
(0.50)

91.85

0.636

2

0.0299
(2.14)*

-0.0880
(5.60)*

-0.0571
(1.98)*

-0.0269
(0.99)

18.6

0.258

3

-0.0038
(7.79)*

-0.0071
(13.31)*

-0.0018
1.87)

-0.0006
(0.66)

74.03

0.0637

4

-0.0039
(16.16)*

-0.0013
(4.94)*

0.0009
(1.86)
-0.0004
(0.34)

81.68

0.608

78.02

0.526

-0.0006
(0.85)

9.62

0.111

5

-0.0072
(11.78)*

-0.0010
(1.98)*
-0.0019
(1.68)

6

-0.0014
(3.44)*

-0.0010
(1.38)

Notes:

^ Parentheses show t statistics.
^ VAR(i) and ISS(i) are in natural log form.
Dependent variables are actual gross spread and actual underwriter compensation for
underwriting services only for regressions 1 and 2, respectively; excess compensation based upon
actual gross spread for regressions 3 and 5; and, excess compensation based upon underwriter
compensation for underwriting services only in regressions 4 and 6.
VAR(i) = annualized rate of return variance based on stock returns generated over the first
30 trading days;
ISS(i) = dollar value of shares offered forsale for security i;
COMP(i) = underwriter competition measured as a (0,1) dummy variable indicating the
presence or absence of a leading investment banking firm in the offering;
H(i) = a (0,1) dummy variable indicating a hot or cold new issue market.
* Significant at the 0.05 level of significance.

for excess compensation using a one day put option maturity since excess
compensation based upon other option maturities provides similar results.
Regression 3 uses excess compensation generated by assuming that the gross
spread represents payment for underwriting risk. Regression 4 uses excess
compensation based upon only the underw riting portion of total
compensation, net of fees paid for management and distribution. The results
of both regressions are similar. Excess compensation is strongly negatively
related to issue riskiness, issue size and competition among underwriters and
to a lesser degree, market environment.
Although the negative coefficient on return variance is not surprising,
there are other possible explanations for this finding. First, it may be that
we have systematically mis-estimated IPO return variance, i.e., measurement
error exists. If so, our variance estimates of high risk stocks are too large
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and our variance estimates of low risk stocks are too small. This would
contribute to the negative coefficient on return variance in Regressions 3 and
4. To correct for this possible bias, each firm’s return variance is adjusted
using a Bayesian approach similar to that used by Vasicek [27] and Marsh
[14].*’ When Regressions 3 and 4 are reestimated using Bayesian adjusted
variances, the results (not shown) are virtually unchanged and suggest that
measurement error in the return variance estimate is not responsible for these
findings. A second possibility we consider is the lim it on underwriter
compensation in IPOs proposed by the National Association of Security
Dealers (NASD). NASD suggests that underwriter compensation in excess
of 14% should be justified by the underwriting syndicate.** This restriction,
if operative, could cause underwriters to lim it their compensation to 14% or
less and thereby earn low or even negative excess compensation on high risk
issues. T his could produce the negative relation between excess
compensation and issue riskiness reported above. To address this possibility,
we eliminated from the sample all IPOs which had theoretical compensation
(put value using one day maturity) greater than 2.8%. Since the underwriting
portion of actual compensation averages about 22% of total compensation
for our sample, this eliminates IPOs from the sample which have theoretical
compensation of 14% or more. Accordingly, this eliminates all IPOs for
which the NASD regulation should be operative hence, eliminates the
possibility of low or negative excess compensation due to NASD regulations.
We reestimated Regressions 3 and 4 (not shown) with the new sample and
found no differences in the regression results. This suggests NASD
regulations are not responsible for the negative relation between excess
compensation and return variance.
It appears that underwriters behave in a way that is consistent with the
observed negative relationship between excess underwriting profits and IPO
return variance — the results are not due to measurement error or NASD
regulations. Another possible explanation we consider for this finding is that
underwriters underprice high risk issues more than low risk issues. By
underpricing, underwriters ensure these issues sell out quickly diereby
minimizing marketing costs and mitigating the underwriting risk proxied by
return variance. In effect, realized excess compensation for high variance stocks
would be systematically greater than the excess compensation we estimate here.
The underpricing literature is consistent with this explanation: it suggests high
risk IPOs are underpriced more than low risk IPOs (see Ritter [20] and Bae
and Levy [2]). To examine this possibility we included first day return as an
independent variable in Regressions 3 and 4 (not shown). The coefficient on
first day return was negative, as expected, but not significant (t=0.2) in either
case. While these results are consistent with the underpricing explanation, they
provide only weak evidence for the hypothesis.
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Finally, we omit VAR(i) since it appears as an independent variable and
also affects our dependent variable. Regressions 5 and 6, as seen in Table
3, replicate Regressions 3 and 4, respectively, but VAR(?) is omitted as an
independent variable. Thus, Regression 5 has as its dependent variable excess
compensation generated using total underwriter compensation as the actual
underwriting risk premium, while Regression 6 uses excess compensation
as based on the underwriting activity of the gross spread. When variance was
omitted we continued to obtain significant F statistics and the signs on the
coefficients were generally not affected.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using the Black-Scholes OPM, and as based on a covered call position
established by the underwriter in the dealings with the issuer and investors,
put values were estimated and compared to underwriter compensation for
a sample of 209 firm commitment IPOs. If the gross spread is viewed as
compensation for the underwriting function (i.e., no underwriting expenses
exist), positive excess compensation occurs for all option maturities.
However, assuming that underwriting expenses do occur for underwriters,
and when that part of underwriter compensation designated for marketing,
origination and management is excluded, excess compensation is positive
for issues that sell out quickly and negative for issues that sell out more
slowly. On average, it appears that IPO shares sold to investors in less than
three days provide undenvriters positive excess compensation for their
underwriting services. IPO shares that sell in more than three days produce
negative excess compensation. Since most firm commitment IPOs sell out
quickly, most issues provide positive excess compensation to investment
bankers. This positive excess compensation may represent quasi-rent
collected by underwriters for the use of their “reputation”. However, a few
slow moving issues will increase average maturity substantially and decrease
excess compensation. In addition, our findings are consistent with the
underpricing literature: underpricing provides investment bankers a means
of disposing of IPO shares quickly and avoiding economic losses from
underwriting activity.
The results also show the amount of excess compensation earned by
underwriters is negatively related to the size of the IPO, the degree of
competition among underwriters, and the riskiness of the issue. These results
are similar to those obtained for new issues of seasoned common stock and
suggest that underwriters earn less excess compensation as issue size, riskiness
and underwriter competition increase. The negative relation between excess

66

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

2(1) 1992

compensation and IPO variance is consistent with the underpricing
literature, although our results are somewhat inconclusive. It does seem clear,
however, the negative relation between excess compensation and IPO return
variance is not due to either measurement error in the variance estimates or
NASD regulations lim iting total underwriter compensation to 14% or less.
A useful extension to this work would be the determination of the actual
time required to sell issues in the IPO market. This would provide direct
empirical evidence on the degree of efficiency in the market for underwriting
services among investment bankers in firm commitment offerings.
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NOTES
1. Kunimura and lihara [12] also found positive mean excess compensation earned by
underwriters in Japan and the United Kingdom.
2. Whether underwriters realize any excess compensation on a particular issue depends
upon how long, ex post, the issue takes to sell out. Our concern in this paper is not
on whether excess compensation is realized but instead on how underwriter services are
priced in the IPO market. We do, however, address below the liklihood of underwriters
realizing excess compensation in the IPO market.
3. See, for example, Merton [16].
4. Section #9 of a typical Master Agreement Among Underwriters states, “...this Agreement
shall terminate 30 days after the initial public offering date of the Securities....” During
this 30 day period underwriters are legally bound to “...the performance of the
Underwriter Agreement...” Similarly, during this period the lead underwriter(s)
maintain the right to “...postpone the closing date...; ...exercise any right of
cancellation...; determine the initial public offering price...; ...make changes in the terms
of the offering....”
5. The variance measure utilized does not include the first day return (i.e., offer price vs.
first day closing price). However, the closing price of the first trading day is used to
help measure the second trading day’s return. Thus, 29 daily returns are used to measure
return variance. Since the first day’s closing price may reflect activities performed by
the underwriter to stabilize the market for the stock, daily return variance was also
measured excluding the first day altogether. That is, 28 days of returns were used to
measure return variance. This second measure resulted in a sample annualized return
variance that was 1.5% lower relative to the variance measure that included the first day’s
closing price. Overall, excess compensation results were not significantly different using
this second measure of return variance relative to using the first. Consequendy, only
results utilizing the first measure of return variance (i.e., 29 days of returns) are reported
here.
6. Regulation A of the Securities Act provides for exemption from detailed registration
(with the SEC) of any issue with an initial market value of less than $1,500,000 ($300,000
prior to 1978).
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7. Firms for which the initial offering of stock was preceeded by a public offering of debt
securities were not considered IPOs. This characterization parallels Booth and Smith
[5].
8. See Ritter [20].
9. Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens [3] provide evidence that warrant provisions, when
present, are between 45-80% of the underwriter spread in firm commitment IPOs,
depending on the valuation model used. They found that warrants tend to be used more
in high-risk offerings and may represent a way to circumvent regulatory compensation
limits as well as a means to address information asymmetry between issuing companies
and investors. Since these warrants are typically not exercisable for at least one year
following the offer, the actual compensation to underwriters possessing these warrants
is uncertain and, therefore, not considered in this study.
10. The difference between price per share offered to investors and the price per share paid
to the issuing firm divided by the price per share offered to investors is used to measure
underwriter compensation in percent terms. This is typical in the IPO literature—see
Marsh [14].
11. The 1987 data includes an offering in excess of $1 billion by Consolidated Rail, formerly
Penn Central Corporation. Excluding this IPO had no impact on the results reported
below hence we continue to include it in the sample.
12. Technically, excess compensation could also occur because the Black/Scholes Option
Pricing Model is inappropriate for modeling underwriter compensation in firm
commitment IPOs or because the model itself is misspecified. Smith [23] discusses the
appropriateness of the model in this context and Rubinstein [22] compares the Black/
Scholes formulation of the option pricing model against alternative specifications.
13. A second set of estimated option values was calculated using the closing price on the
first trading day as the proxy for the market price of the stock. In the case of OTC stocks,
the closing ask price was used as the market price. The use of the first day closing price
as a proxy for the market price is based on the assumption that it represents, in an efficient
market sense, the equilibrium price of the stock on the offer day. Given the relative
amount of underpricing associated with this sample, in particular, and IPOs in general,
one would expect that excess compensation would increase since the estimated put
valuation would reflect an option that is now out-of-the-money. Such is the result here
as the excess compensation for underwriting services only is —2.02%, —0.08% and 0.92%
for 30 day, 8 day, and 1 day option maturities, respectively. The excess compensation
result for the 8 day option maturity is not significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level
of significance. This result indicates that underwriters earn excess compensation as long
as the issue sells out in less than 8 days. Thus, it may provide an upper bound time
limit as to when the underwriter must fully distribute the shares or suffer losses for the
underwriting activities. Nevertheless, the result provides empirical evidence supporting
the underpricing results seen in so many studies.
14. Bae and Levy [2] provide an estimate of the cost of holding inventory and the cost to
the underwriter for having to pay the issuing company while still waiting for payment
from the investor. They estimate this cost, given a 10% broker call rate and a 10 day
lag time in receiving funds from investors, to be P(0.137%) + (1- P)(2*0.137%) where P
represents the probability of a successful issue.
15. Two other variables have been used as proxies for issuing company risk, the number
of years the company has been incorporated (AGE(O) and the dollar size of the company’s
assets (ASSET(i)). The notion is that the older the company and the larger its asset base,
the less risky the company. However, ISS(i) and ASSET(i) are highly, positively
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correlated and AGE(i) has not been found to be consistently related to underwriter
compensation. Although not shown here, regressions 1 and 2 were performed with
AGE(i) and the natural log of ASSET(i) in place of VAR(i). Only the coefficient for
ASSET(i) was found to have any significance, although it lowered the explanatory power
of ISS(i). The coefficient for AGE(«) was not significantly different from zero. Overall,
the explanatory power of each regression was no greater than the regressions involving
VAR(0
16. See Marsh [14] for an extended discussion.
17. The Bayesian adjusted variance estimate for security i, AdjVar(i), is shown below:
A djV a,« = YE(S)m + YE(51(S2
E(i)+E(S) EB+E(S)
where,
Var(i) =
E(i) =
n=
E(S) =
Var(S) =

the variance estimate for security i;
the variance of the estimate of Var(i)=Var(i)/2n;
the number of return observations used to estimate Var(2);
the cross-sectional sample variance of Var(i) estimates;
the cross-sectional sample mean of Var(i) estimates.

18. NASD Notice to Members 83-15 dated April 8, 1983 specifies guidelines for firm
commitment IPOs, secondary offerings and best efforts offerings.
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